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1 Introduction
In an important contribution Shimer and Smith (2000) establish the existence of
a steady state equilibrium in a heterogeneous agent matching model with search
frictions, characterize the structure of the resulting equilibrium matches, and obtain
conditions under which assortative matching (Becker, 1973) arises in equilibrium.
Smith (2006) extends these results, derived under the assumption of transferable
utilities, to a setting with non-transferable utilities. While Shimer and Smith (2000)
and Smith (2006) derive their results in a setting with one population of agents and
continuous time, their results also apply when there are two distinct populations
(women and men or buyers and sellers) or time is discrete. Similarly, while Shimer
and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006) assume that there is a fixed population of
agents with entry of unmatched agents resulting from the exogenous destruction of
matches, as noted in Eeckhout (1999) this is equivalent to the alternative formulation
in which there is an exogenous entry flow of agents and unmatched agents exit from
the market at a fixed, strictly positive rate.1
In one respect, though, the analysis in Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith
(2006) hinges on a particular assumption employed in both papers, namely that
matches are generated according to a quadratic search technology, which “seems
a poor approximation” unless one deals with “an economy with a low density of
potential partners” (Diamond and Maskin, 1979, p. 283). To prove existence of
a steady state equilibrium, both Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006) rely
on Lemma 4 in Shimer and Smith (2000). Following Smith (2006) we will refer to
this result as the fundamental matching lemma. The fundamental matching lemma
asserts that the steady state condition, which requires that the flow creation and flow
destruction of matches for every type of agent balances, implicitly defines the density
of unmatched agents as a continuous function of agents’ acceptance decisions. As
noted in Shimer and Smith (2000) their proof of this result makes essential use of
the assumption of a quadratic search technology. In particular, their proof does not
work for the commonly studied linear search technology,2 precluding the application
of their existence result to heterogeneous agent matching models positing such a
search technology.
The purpose of this note is to show that the fundamental matching lemma holds
for a linear search technology in a setting which is otherwise identical to the one
considered in Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006). Because the proof of the
fundamental matching lemma is the only result in these papers which relies on the
quadratic search technology, our result implies that not only the characterization
but also the existence results from these papers hold for models with a linear search
1The results from Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006) also apply if one assumes that
agents who match and leave the market are immediately replaced by identical clones. Even though
many papers in the literature (McNamara and Collins, 1990; Morgan, 1998; Burdett and Wright,
1998; Bloch and Ryder, 2000; Chade, 2001; Adachi, 2003; Chen, 2005) consider such cloning models,
it is difficult to think of any good economic motivation for such an assumption.
2In a linear search technology the mass of matches is proportional to the mass of agents searching
for a partner. Linear search technologies thus possess constant returns to scale.
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technology. We view this result as significant because – with the exception of Burdett
and Coles (1997, Theorem 1), who obtain existence under a log-concavity assumption
– the existence of steady state equilibria in heterogeneous agent matching models
with a linear search technology has so far only been established for some simple
examples with discrete type distributions,3 whereas we consider continuous type
distributions. In particular, our version of the fundamental matching lemma does
implies existence of steady state equilibria for the models in Lu and McAfee (1996)
and Eeckhout (1999) and dispenses with the log-concavity assumption in Burdett
and Coles (1997).
2 Flow Balance and the Fundamental Matching Lemma
As suggested in Burdett and Coles (1999) it is useful to think of the equilibrium
problem in heterogeneous agent matching models in terms of two smaller problems.
First, for a given steady state population of unmatched agents in the market one may
consider partial equilibrium (Burdett and Coles, 1997), requiring that all unmatched
agents use optimal strategies (specifying, in particular, their decision whether or not
to match with a particular type of agent they may encounter) given the strategies
of everyone else. Second, given a steady state population of unmatched agents and
their strategies one may calculate the mass and distribution of types exiting the
market per unit time. In a steady state the corresponding exit flow for each type
should be equal to the entry flow of that type. We will refer to this condition as
the flow balance condition. A steady state equilibrium obtains if a population of
unmatched agents and a strategy profile satisfy both the partial equilibrium and the
flow balance condition.
Our interest in the following is in the flow balance condition. Consequently,
there is no need to spell out the strategic aspects relevant for the partial equilibrium
analysis. In Shimer and Smith (2000) and Smith (2006) flow balance requires
δ (`(x)− u(x)) = ρu(x)
∫ 1
0
α(x, y)u(y)dy (1)
for all x ∈ [0, 1], where x denotes the type of an agent. In this equation the Borel
measurable function ` : [0, 1]→ (0,∞) is the type density, satisfying ` def= infx `(x) >
0 and ` def= supx `(x) <∞, and the function u : [0, 1]→ (0,∞), satisfying u(x) ≤ `(x)
for all x, is the endogenous unmatched density. Let
U = {u ∈ L1([0, 1]) | u(x) > 0 ∀x, u essentially bounded}.
The density of matched agents is `(x)− u(x). These agents’ matches are destroyed
at an exogenous rate δ > 0, so that the left side of (1) represents the entry flow
3In unpublished work Chen (2002) proves existence in a marriage model featuring a linear search
technology. His argument makes heavy use of the simplicity afforded by his assumption that there
are only two types of agents. Burdett and Coles (1997) consider a similar example.
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of agents of type x into the pool of unmatched agents. The right side represents
the corresponding exit flow and embodies the assumption of a quadratic search
technology: anyone unmatched encounters unmatched agents in Y ⊆ [0, 1] at rate
ρ
∫
Y u(y)dy, where ρ > 0. Hence, the total mass of encounters between unmatched
agents per unit time is ρ(
∫ 1
0 u(y)dy)
2 and thus quadratic in the mass of unmatched
agents. Not all encounters result in a match. This is captured by the inclusion of
the match indicator function α : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1] in the right hand side of (1): the
term α(x, y) = α(y, x) indicates the proportion of encounters between agents of type
x and y resulting in a match. Let
A = {α ∈ L1([0, 1]2) | 0 ≤ α(x, y) = α(y, x) ≤ 1 ∀x, y}.
In their fundamental matching lemma Shimer and Smith (2000, Lemma 4) assert
that (1) has a unique solution uα ∈ U for all α ∈ A and that the map α→ uα from
A to U is continuous with respect to the || · ||1 -norm. The counterpart to (1) for a
linear search technology, in which it is assumed that any unmatched agent encounters
unmatched agents with types in Y ⊆ [0, 1] at rate ρ ∫Y u(y)dy/ ∫ 10 u(y)dy, is
δ (`(x)− u(x)) = ρu(x)
∫ 1
0 α(x, y)u(y)dy∫ 1
0 u(y)dy
. (2)
Fundamental Matching Lemma. For all match indicator functions α ∈ A there
is a unique unmatched density uα ∈ U such that the flow balance condition (2) holds.
The map α 7→ uα from A to U is continuous with respect to the || · ||1 -norm.
To obtain this result we proceed in three steps, establishing existence, uniqueness,
resp. continuity of the population solving the flow balance condition. Throughout
details are relegated to the Appendix. In Subsection 3.4 we explain how and why
the structure of our proof differs from the proof in Shimer and Smith (2000).
3 Proof of the Fundamental Matching Lemma
It is convenient to define ρˆ = ρ/δ, so that the flow balance condition (2) can be
rewritten as
`(x) = u(x)
[
1 + ρˆ
∫ 1
0 α(x, y)u(y)dy∫ 1
0 u(y)dy
]
. (3)
Furthermore, let u = `/(1 + ρˆ), u = `, and
C = {u ∈ L1([0, 1]) | u ≤ u(x) ≤ u ∀x}.
3.1 Step 1: Existence
Here we show that an unmatched density u ∈ U satisfying the flow balance condition
(3) exists for any match indicator function α ∈ A. We proceed by reformulating (3)
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as a continuous fixed point equation in the Lebesgue space L1 and verifying that our
fixed point mapping satisfies the assumptions of Schauder’s fixed point theorem.
For all α ∈ A, u ∈ U solves (3) if and only if it is a fixed point of φα : U → U ,
where
φα(u)(x) =
`(x)
1 + ρˆ
∫
u(y)α(x,y)dy∫
u(y)dy
. (4)
Any fixed point belongs to C because
φα(U) ⊆ C. (5)
The restricted map φα : C → C has a fixed point because it satisfies the assumptions
of Schauder’s fixed point theorem (see Granas and Dugundji (2003, p. 119) for the
version of Schauder’s theorem we are using). First, φα is continuous with respect
to the || · ||1 -norm (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix). Second, C is convex. Third
(due to the presence of the integral operator in the definition of φα), the set φα(C)
is relatively compact; i.e., the || · ||1 -closure φα(C) is compact (Lemma 3). Forth,
because any sequence that converges in the || · ||1 -norm has a subsequence that
converges almost everywhere (Aliprantis and Burkinshaw, 1998, Lemma 31.6), C is
|| · ||1 -closed, implying φα(C) ⊆ C.
3.2 Step 2: Uniqueness
By appropriately rescaling the unmatched density we reformulate the flow balance
condition as an algebraically convenient quadratic equation: Lemma 4 shows that
u ∈ U solves (3) if and only if ν ∈ U defined by
ν =
u√∫
u(y)dy
(6)
solves
` = G(α, ν), (7)
where G : A× L2([0, 1])→ L2([0, 1]) is defined by
G(α, ν)(x) = ν(x)
∫ 1
0
ν(y)(1 + ρˆα(x, y))dy. (8)
To obtain uniqueness, it is sufficient to show that G (when viewed as a function
of ν) is injective on the set
D = {ν ∈ L1([0, 1]) | ν ≤ ν(x) ≤ ν ∀x},
where ν = u/
√
u and ν = u/
√
u: because G(α, ν) = ` implies ν ∈ D (Lemma 5), it
follows that (7) has at most one solution for given α ∈ A. As the transformation
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ν = u/
√∫
u(y)dy is invertible on U (Lemma 1), it follows that for all α ∈ A there
exists at most one u ∈ U solving (3).
To show that G is injective we use the observation that a quadratic function is
injective if its Frechet derivative, viewed as a linear operator on the space L2([0, 1]),
is injective (Rall, 1969). Let || · ||2 denote the standard norm in the Hilbert space
L2([0, 1]). For all α ∈ A, the Frechet derivative of G(α, ·) at ν ∈ L2([0, 1]) with
respect to the || · ||2 -norm is the continuous linear operator J(α, ν) : L2([0, 1])→
L2([0, 1]) given by
J(α, ν)(g)(x) =
∫
(g(x)ν(y) + ν(x)g(y))(1 + ρˆα(x, y))dy.
Lemma 6 establishes that for all ν ∈ D, α ∈ A, and g ∈ L2([0, 1]), g 6= 0, we have
J(α, ν)(g) 6= 0. Observing that
G(α, ν)−G(α, ν ′) = J(α, ν + ν
′
2
)(ν − ν ′)
yields the desired conclusion.
3.3 Step 3: Continuity
For any α ∈ A, the quadratic equation G(α, ν) = ` has a solution ν ∈ U (this follows
from Step 1 and Lemma 4). From Step 2, the solution is unique and in D; denote
it by να. It is sufficient to show that the function α 7→ να is continuous on A with
respect to the || · ||1 -norm. (Using Lemma 1, it follows that α 7→ uα is continuous
with respect to the || · ||1 -norm.)
Consider any sequence (αn) ⊆ A and α ∈ A such that || αn − α ||1 → 0.
Because |αn(x) − α(x)| ≤ 2 for all x, ( || αn − α ||2 )2 ≤ 2 || αn − α ||1 , implying
|| αn − α ||2 → 0. In Lemma 7 we establish that α 7→ να is (Lipschitz) continuous
with respect to the || · ||2 -norm. Hence, || ναn − να ||2 → 0. From the Ho¨lder
inequality, || ναn − να ||1 ≤ || ναn − να ||2 . Hence, || ναn − να ||1 → 0, as was to
be shown.
3.4 Linear vs. Quadratic Search Technology
The proof of the fundamental matching lemma for the quadratic search technology
in Shimer and Smith (2000) employs a different method from the one we use above to
obtain existence and uniqueness of a population solving the flow balance condition.
Their counterpart (Shimer and Smith, 2000, Appendix B) to equation (3) is
`(x) = u(x)
[
1 + ρˆ
∫ 1
0
α(x, y)u(y)dy
]
, (9)
which gives rise to the fixed point equation
u(x) =
`(x)
1 + ρˆ
∫ 1
0 α(x, y)u(y)dy
. (10)
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Their critical idea is to apply a log transformation of u to rewrite (10) as
ν(x) = log
(
`(x)
1 + ρˆ
∫ 1
0 α(x, y)e
ν(y)dy
)
(11)
and to show that the mapping obtained from the right side of this equation is a
contraction mapping (with respect to the sup-norm) from an appropriately chosen
subset of L∞ into itself, so that existence and uniqueness of a solution follows from
Banach’s fixed point theorem. There is no straightforward extension of this approach
to the case of the linear search technology. Of course, starting from either (3) or
(7) a log transformation may be applied to obtain a fixed point equation similar
to (11) for the linear case. The difficulty is that the arguments from Shimer and
Smith (2000) no longer apply to show that the corresponding fixed point mappings
is contractive.
While Step 1 of our proof has no counterpart in Shimer and Smith (2000),4 Steps
2 and 3 of our proof build on arguments provided by Shimer and Smith to prove
continuity of the unmatched density in the match indicator function. Besides our
demonstration that these arguments may be used to infer uniqueness, there are two
novel insights in our analysis. First, because (9) is already quadratic in the un-
matched density u, no rescaling as in (6) is required when using the arguments from
Step 2 and 3 to infer uniqueness and continuity for the quadratic search technology.
Second, while the right side of (9) contains a linear term such a term is absent in
the corresponding quadratic function (8) we use in the linear case. The presence of
such a linear term simplifies the proofs of the counterparts to our Lemmas 6 and 7
obtained in Shimer and Smith (2000, Appendix B).
4 Appendix
The following lemmas are used in the proof of the fundamental matching lemma.
Lemma 1. For all r ∈ IR, the map τr : U → U defined by
τr(u)(x) =
u(x)
(
∫
u(y)dy)r
is continuous with respect to the || · ||1 -norm. If r 6= 1, then τr/(r−1) is the inverse
of τr.
Proof. To show that τr is continuous, consider un → u. Then
∫
un →
∫
u, hence,
(
∫
un)−r → (
∫
u)−r. Using
τr(un)(x)− τr(u)(x) = un(x)(
∫
un)−r − un(x)(
∫
u)−r
+un(x)(
∫
u)−r − u(x)(
∫
u)−r,
4It is easy to see, though, that the same method as in Step 1 of our proof can be used to establish
the existence of a solution to (10).
7
one sees that
|| τr(un)− τr(u) ||1 ≤ || un ||1
∣∣∣∣(∫ un)−r − (∫ u)−r∣∣∣∣
+ || un − u ||1 (
∫
u)−r,
showing that τr(un)→ τr(u).
For any s, we have τrτs = τr+s−rs = τsτr. Choosing s = r/(r − 1) if r 6= 1, we
have τr+s−rs = τ0, showing that τs is the inverse of τr.
Lemma 2. Let α ∈ A. The map φα is continuous with respect to the || · ||1 -norm.
Proof. Let U = {u ∈ L1([0, 1]) | u(x) ≥ 0 ∀x}. Observe that φα = κψατ1, where
ψα : U → U is defined by
ψα(u)(x) =
∫
u(y)α(x, y)dy, (12)
and κ : U → U is given by
κ(u)(x) =
`(x)
1 + ρˆu(x)
.
From Lemma 1, τ1 is continuous. To show that ψα is continuous, let u, v ∈ U ; then
|| ψα(u)− ψα(v) ||1 ≤
∫ ∫
| u(y)− v(y) | α(x, y)dydx ≤ || u− v ||1 .
To show that κ is continuous, let u, v ∈ U ; then
κ(u)(x)− κ(v)(x) = `(x)ρˆ v(x)− u(x)
(1 + ρˆu(x))(1 + ρˆv(x))
,
implying || κ(u)− κ(v) ||1 ≤ uρˆ || u− v ||1 .
Lemma 3. Let α ∈ A. The set φα(C) is relatively compact.
Proof. Using the decomposition φα = κψατ1 from the proof of Lemma 2, it is suffi-
cient to show that the set ψα(τ1(C)) is relatively compact.
It is convenient to extend any α ∈ A to IR2 via α(x, y) = 0 for all (x, y) 6∈ [0, 1]2,
and extend any ψα(u) to IR via ψα(u)(x) = 0 for all x 6∈ [0, 1]. Then (12), with
integration area IR, holds for all x ∈ IR. Let  > 0. From Adams (1975, p. 31),
ψατ1(C) is relatively compact if (i) it is || · ||1 -bounded and (ii) there exists δ′ > 0
such that∫
IR
| ψα(u)(x+ h)− ψα(u)(x) | dx <  for all u ∈ τ1(C) and |h| < δ′.
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Because
u(x) ≤ u
u
for all x ∈ [0, 1], u ∈ τ1(C), (13)
we have || ψα(u) ||1 ≤ u/u for all u ∈ τ1(C), implying (i).
For all h ∈ IR, define the translation operator Th : L1(IR2) → L1(IR2) by
Th(α)(x, y) = α(x + h, y). As remarked by Adams (1975, p. 32), we have the
continuity property
|| Th(α)− α ||1 → 0 as h→ 0. (14)
For all u ∈ τ1(C) and x, h ∈ IR,
| ψα(u)(x+ h)− ψα(u)(x) |
(13)
≤ u
u
∫
| Th(α)(x, y)− α(x, y) | dy. (15)
From (14), there exists δ′ > 0 such that || Th(α)− α ||1 < u/u if |h| < δ′. Thus,
for all u ∈ τ1(C) and |h| < δ′,∫
IR
| ψα(u)(x+ h)− ψα(u)(x) | dx
(15)
≤ u
u
∫
IR2
| Th(α)(x, y)− α(x, y) | dy dx = u
u
|| Th(α)− α ||1 < ,
implying (ii).
Lemma 4. For all α ∈ A and u, ν ∈ U : φα(u) = u⇔
(
G(α, ν) = ` and ν = τ1/2u
)
.
Proof. Using Lemma 1 and the definition of φα,
φα(u) = u ⇔ (φατ−1(ν) = τ−1(ν) and u = τ−1ν)
⇔ (φα(ν) = τ−1(ν) and ν = τ1/2u) .
A straightforward computation shows that the equation φα(ν) = τ−1(ν) is satisfied
if and only if G(α, ν) = `.
Lemma 5. For all α ∈ A and ν ∈ U , if G(α, ν) = ` then ν ∈ D.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the inverse of τ1/2 is τ−1. Hence, G(α, ν) = ` implies
φα(τ−1ν) = τ−1ν by Lemma 4. Hence, τ−1ν ∈ C by (5), implying ν ∈ τ1/2(C) ⊆ D
by definition of D.
Lemma 6. There exists η > 0 such that, for all ν ∈ D, α ∈ A, and g ∈ L2([0, 1]),
|| J(α, ν)(g) ||2 ≥ η || g ||2 .
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Proof. Fix some ν. Using the norm || · ||2′ and the inner product 〈·, ·〉 in the
Hilbert space L2{[0, 1], 1/ν},
2 || g ||2′ || J(α, ν)(g) ||2′
≥ 2〈g, J(α, µ)(g)〉
= 2
∫
g(x)J(α, ν)(g)(x)
1
ν(x)
dx
=
∫ ∫ [
2g(x)2
ν(y)
ν(x)
+ 2g(x)g(y)
]
(1 + ρˆα(x, y))dxdy
α symmetric
=
∫ ∫ [
g(x)2
ν(y)
ν(x)
+ g(y)2
ν(x)
ν(y)
+ 2g(x)g(y)
]
(1 + ρˆα(x, y))dxdy
=
∫ ∫ [
g(x)
√
ν(y)/ν(x) + g(y)
√
ν(x)/ν(y)
]2
(1 + ρˆα(x, y))dxdy
≥
∫ ∫ [
g(x)
√
ν(y)/ν(x) + g(y)
√
ν(x)/ν(y)
]2
dxdy
≥ ν
ν
∫
g(x)2dx+
ν
ν
∫
g(y)2dy +
∫ ∫
2g(x)g(y)dxdy
≥ 2ν
2
ν
∫
g(x)2
1
ν(x)
dx+ 2
(∫
g(x)
)2
≥ 2ν
2
ν
∫
g(x)2
1
ν(x)
dx
= 2
ν2
ν
( || g ||2′ )2.
Dividing by || g ||2′ yields
|| J(α, ν)(g) ||2′ ≥ ν
2
ν
|| g ||2′ .
We obtain the desired formula with η = ν5/2/ν3/2.
Lemma 7. There exists ζ > 0 such that,
if
α, α′ ∈ A, ν, ν ′ ∈ D, G(α, ν) = `, G(α′, ν ′) = `,
then
|| ν − ν ′ ||2 ≤ ζ || α− α′ ||2 .
Proof. Let h = ν − ν ′. Straightforward calculation shows
G(α′, ν)− ` = G(α′, ν ′ + h)−G(α′, ν ′) = J(α′, ν ′ + h
2
)(h). (16)
Moreover,
G(α′, ν)(x)−G(α, ν)(x) = ρˆν(x)
∫
ν(y)(α′(x, y)− α(x, y))dy.
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Hence, ∫
| G(α′, ν)(x)−G(α, ν)(x) |2 dx
≤ ρˆ2ν4
∫ (∫
| α′(x, y)− α(x, y) | dy
)2
dx
by Ho¨lder’s inequality
≤ ρˆ2ν4
∫ ∫
(α′(x, y)− α(x, y))2dydx.
Hence,
|| G(α′, ν)−G(α, ν)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=`
||2 ≤ ρˆν2 || α− α′ ||2 . (17)
Hence,
|| ν − ν ′ ||2
Lemma 6≤ 1
η
|| J(α′, µ′ + h
2
)(h) ||2
(16),(17)
≤ ρν
2
η
|| α− α′ ||2 ,
so that the desired claim holds with ζ = ρν2/η.
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